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The extreme core allocations of the assignment game
Abstract: Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper
a characterization of their set of extreme points of the core is provided, which
is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set,
a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution
to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole
set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with
the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of
the assignment game.
Key words: Core, assignment game, convex games.
JEL: C71
Resum: Tot i que els jocs d’assignacio´, un model de mercat a dues bandes
amb utilitat transferible, no so´n en general jocs convexos, en aquest treball
donem una caracteritzacio´ dels punts extrems del seu core que tambe´ e´s certa
per als jocs convexos. Per a cada ordenacio´ del conjunt de jugadors, definim un
vector de pagaments on cada jugador rep la seva contribucio´ marginal en cert
joc redu¨ıt jugat pels seus predecessors. Demostrem que el conjunt de vectors
de contribucio´ marginal redu¨ıts, que per als jocs convexos coincideixen amb els
vectors de contribucio´ marginal usuals, coincideix amb el conjunt d’extrems
del core del joc d’assignacio´.
1 Introduction
Assignment games were introduced by Shapley and Shubick (1972) as a model
for a two–sided market with transferable utility. The player set consists of the
union of two finite disjoint sets M ∪M ′ , where M is the set of buyers and
M ′ is the set of sellers. We will denote by n the cardinality of M ∪ M ,
n = m+m′ , where m and m′ are, respectively, the cardinalities of M and
M ′ . The worth of any two–person coalition formed by a buyer i ∈ M and
a seller j ∈ M ′ is w(i, j) = aij ≥ 0 . This real numbers can be arranged
in a matrix and determine the worth of any other coalition S ∪ T , where
S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ , in the following way: w(S ∪ T ) = max{∑(i,j)∈µ aij |
µ ∈ M(S, T )} , being M(S, T ) the set of matchings between S and T . A
matching (or assignment) between S and T is a subset µ of S × T such
that each player belongs at most to one pair in µ . It will be assumed as usual
that
∑
(i,j)∈∅ aij = 0 and thus, a coalition formed only by sellers or only by
buyers, will have worth zero. Moreover, we say a buyer i ∈M is not assigned
by µ if (i, j) 6∈ µ for all j ∈M ′ (and similarly for sellers).
Shapley and Shubik proved the balancedness of these games and also the
existence of two special extreme core allocations: in one of them each seller
achieves his maximum core payoff and in the other one each buyer does. De-
mange (1982) proves that this maximum payoff of a player in the core of the
assignment games is his marginal contribution. The same result is stated
without proof by Leonard (1983). The reader will find Demange’s proof in
the monography by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
In 1987, Balinski and Gale give a characterization of the extreme points
of the core of the assignment game in terms of the connectedness of a graph.
From this characterization follows that in each extreme core point of an assign-
ment game there is a player who receives a zero payoff. This last property was
already stated by Thompson (1981) and has recently been used by Hammers
et. al.(1999) to prove that every extreme point of the core of the assignment
game is a marginal worth vector.
Assignment games are hardly ever convex games. Roughly speaking, an
assignment game is convex if and only if the assignment matrix is diagonal up
to a reordering of the player set. This will be proved later on in corollary 14
(see also Solymosi and Raghavan, 2000). Not being, in general, a convex game,
the core of the assignment game has two important properties in common with
the core of convex games:
Property 1 In each extreme core allocation of the assignment game there is
a player who is paid his marginal contribution.
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Property 2 Moreover, all marginal contributions are attained in the core of
the assignment game (see Demange, 1982 and Leonard, 1983).
The main result of this paper will consist on a charactarization of the set
of extreme core allocations of the assignment game which also holds for the
class of convex games. To this end, some notations are needed.
Let (N, v) be a TU game, where as usual N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is its finite
player set and v : 2N −→ R its characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0 .
A payoff vector will be x ∈ Rn and, for every coalition S ⊆ N we shall
write x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi the payoff to coalition S (where x(∅) = 0 ). The
core of the game (N, v) consists of those payoff vectors which allocate the
worth of the grand coalition in such a way that every other coalition receives
at least its worth by the characteristic function: C(v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) =
v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N } . A game (N, v) has a non-empty core
if and only if it is balanced (see Bondareva, 1963 or Shapley, 1967), that is
to say, the following balancedness conditions hold: v(N) ≥ ∑S∈C αSv(S) ,
where C is a set of coalitions and the weights αs satisfy that for all i ∈ N ,∑
i∈S∈C αi = 1 . It is straightforward to see that the core is a convex set and
we say x ∈ C(v) is an extreme point if y, z ∈ C(v) and x = 1
2
y + 1
2
z imply
y = z . The subgame related to coalition S , v|S , is the restriction of mapping
v to the subcoalitions of S . A game is said to be superadditive when for all
disjoint coalitions S and T , v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ) holds. Notice that, from
the definition, assignment games are always superadditive. Although a game
may be balanced but not superadditive (see an example later), balanced games
always satisfy superadditive inequalities involving the grand coalition. A well
known class of balanced and superadditive games is the class of convex games.
A game (N, v) is convex if and only if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )
for all pair of coalitions S and T .
Marginal worth vectors (where given an ordering, each player receives his
marginal contribution to the set of his predecessors), play an important role
in the core of some games: the core of convex games is the convex hull of the
whole set of marginal worth vectors. More formally, given a game (N, v) and
an ordering θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) on N , the marginal worth vector m
v
θ ∈ Rn is:
(mvθ)in = v(i1, . . . , in−1, in)− v(i1, . . . , in−1)
(mvθ)in−1 = v(i1, . . . , in−1)− v(i1, . . . , in−2)
...
...
(mvθ)i2 = v(i1, i2)− v(i1)
(mvθ)i1 = v(i1)
Following the same idea, given an ordering θ in N , we will introduce
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a new kind of marginal worth vectors where each player also receives her
marginal contribution to her set of predecessors but a reduction of the game
is performed in each step (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 1998).
Definition 3 Given a cooperative game (N, v) and a player i ∈ N we denote
by bvi = v(N) − v(N \ {i}) the marginal contribution of player i and define
the i–marginal game of (N, v) as the game (N \ {i}, vi) where, for all
∅ 6= S ⊆ N \ {i} ,
vi(S) = max{v(S ∪ {i})− bvi , v(S)} ,
This i–marginal game coincides with the reduced game a` laDavis and Maschler
(1965) on N \ {i} at bvi .
Notice first that vi(N \ {i}) = v(N \ {i}) and C(vi) ⊆ C(v|N\{i}) . More-
over, if (N, v) is convex, that is to say, v(S ∪{i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪{i})− v(T )
for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i} , then the i–marginal game vi coincides
with the subgame v|N\{i} .
Take now θ = (i1, . . . , in) an ordering in N , then the reduced marginal
worth vector is rmvθ ∈ Rn :
(rmvθ)in = v(i1, . . . , in−1, in)− v(i1, . . . , in−1) = bvin ,
(rmvθ)in−1 = v
in(i1, . . . , in−1)− vin(i1, . . . , in−2) = bvinin−1 ,
...
...
(rmvθ)ik = v
inin−1···ik+1(i1, . . . , ik)− vinin−1···ik+1(i1, . . . , ik−1) = bv
inin−1···ik+1
ik
,
...
...
(mvθ)i2 = v
inin−1···i3(i1, i2)− vinin−1···i3(i1) = bvinin−1···i3i2 ,
(mvθ)i1 = v
inin−1···i2(i1) = bv
inin−1···i2
i1
,
where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} , the game vinin−1···ik+1 with player set
N \ {in, in−1, . . . , ik+1} , is the ik+1–marginal game of vinin−1···ik+2 .
It is straightforward to see that reduced marginal worth vectors are always
efficient, rmvθ(N) = v(N) and, if the game is convex the reduced marginal
worth vector rmvθ coincides with the marginal worth vector m
v
θ . Moreover, if
one reduced marginal worth vector belongs to the core, then it is an extreme
point (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 1998).
Section 2 relates every extreme point of the core of the assignment game
with an extreme core point of one of its marginal games. Moreover, in this
section we extend property 1 to the successive reduced assignment games.
In section 3 we analyze the core of the successive reduced assignment game.
One of the main difficulties is that the reduction of an asignment game is
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no more an assignment game, as was already pointed out by Owen (1992).
However, we prove that all successive reductions wknkn−1···kr of the assignment
game are balanced (theorem 12). This comes from the fact that property 2
also extends to those successive reductions of the assignment game.
Finally, in section 4, the set of extreme core allocations of the assignment
game is characterized as the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors
(theorem 13). As a consequence of the above result, the case of the convex
assignment game is analyzed.
2 The reduced assignment game
In the sequel we will denote by x−i the restriction of x to coalition N \ {i}
and in general x−i1i2···ik will denote the restriction of x to coalition N \
{i1, . . . , ik} . Given an arbitrary cooperative game (N, v) , some relationships
between the core elements of (N, v) and those of its marginal games (N \
{i}, vi) are already known. From the reduced game property (RGP) of the
core elements (Peleg (1986)), if x ∈ C(v) and xi = bvi , then x−i ∈ C(vi) .
In fact, this relationship is also valid for extreme core elements and, together
with a sort of converse property, will play an important role throughout this
paper. For the sake of comprehensiveness we state them in next proposition
and the reader will find the proof in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (1998).
Proposition 4 1. If x ∈ Ext(C(v)) and for some i ∈ N , xi = bvi ,
then x−i is an extreme point in the core of the i–marginal game, x−i ∈
Ext(C(vi)) .
2. If x−i ∈ Ext(C(vi)) and the condition v(i) ≤ bvi holds, then x =
(x−i; bvi ) ∈ Ext(C(v)) , that is to say, the payoff which allocates to each
player the same payoff that in x−i and to player i his marginal contri-
bution is an extreme core allocation.
Notice that for balanced games, conditions v(i) ≤ bvi , for all i ∈ N ,
always hold and thus
n⋃
k=1
Ext+k(C(v
k)) ⊆ Ext(C(v)) , (1)
where Ext+k(C(v
k)) denotes the set of x ∈ RN such that x−k ∈ Ext(C(vk))
and xk = b
v
k . In general, this inclusion is strict, but for some classes of games
we get an identity.
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Now we focus our attention in the extreme core allocations of the assign-
ment game. Recall that, from Shapley and Shubick (1972), the core of the
assignment game (M ∪M ′, w) is nonempty and can be represented in terms
of an optimal matching in M ∪M ′ . Let µ be one such optimal matching,
then
C(w) =

ui ≥ 0, for all i ∈M ; vj ≥ 0, for all j ∈M ′
ui + vj = aij if (i, j) ∈ µ
(u, v) ∈ RM×M ′ ui + vj ≥ aij if (i, j) 6∈ µ
ui = 0 if i not assigned by µ
vj = 0 if j not assigned by µ
 (2)
In the case of assignment games, inclusion (1) is in fact an equality.
Proposition 5 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, then
Ext(C(w)) =
n⋃
k=1
Ext+k(C(w
k)) .
Proof: Take x ∈ Ext(C(w)) , let us proof that there exists k ∈ M ∪M ′
such that xk = b
w
k . Recall first that, from Thompson (1981) and Balinski
and Gale (1987), there exists i′ ∈ M ∪M ′ such that xi′ = 0 . If this player
i′ is not assigned in any optimal matching of M ∪M ′ , then bwi′ = 0 = xi′ .
Otherwise, assume, without lost of generality, that i′ ∈ M and is assigned
to j′ ∈ M ′ by an optimal matching µ of M ∪M ′ . Then, being x a core
allocation, x(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′})) ≥ w(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′})) and, on the other hand,
as xi′ = 0 ,
x(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′}) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ
(i,j) 6=(i′,j′)
(xi + xj) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ
(i,j) 6=(i′,j′)
aij ≤ w(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′}) ,
as {(i, j) ∈ µ | (i, j) 6= (i′, j′)} is an assignment in M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′}) . Thus,
x(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′})) = w(M ∪ (M ′ \ {j′})) and, by efficiency, xj′ = bwj′ .
To sum up, we have just proved that for any x ∈ Ext(C(w)) there exists
a player k ∈ M ∪ M ′ such that xk = bwk . By the RGP of the extreme
points of the core (part 1 of proposition 4), x−k ∈ Ext(C(wk)) and then
x ∈ Ext+k(C(wk)) . 2
Notice that the above equality also holds for convex games.
Unfortunately, the reduction of an assignment game may not be another
assignment game. This was already pointed out by Owen (1992) and remains
true even for the particular reduced game which is the i–marginal game. Take
for instance M = {1, 2} , M ′ = {3, 4, 5} and w(i, j) = aij given by the matrix
5
3 4 5
1
2
5 3 3
4 3 2
In the above example, the core allocations are those (u, v) ∈ R5 , such
that u1 + v3 = 5, u2 + v4 = 3, v5 = 0 and u1 + v4 ≥ 3, u1 + v5 ≥ 3, u2 +
v3 ≥ 4, u2 + v5 ≥ 2 . This core is the convex hull of three extreme points
which are (3,2,2,1,0), (4,3,1,0,0) and (3,3,2,0,0).
Let us now reduce the game on coalition M ′ \ {4} at bw4 = w(M ∪M ′)−
w(M ∪ (M ′ \ {4})) = 1 . This 4–marginal game is (M ′ \ {4}, w4) , where
w4(S) = max{w(S ∪ {4})− bw4 , w(S)} , for all ∅ 6= S ⊆M ′ \ {4} :
w4(1) = 2 w4(12) = 2 w4(123) = 7
w4(2) = 2 w4(13) = 5 w4(125) = 5
w4(3) = 0 w4(15) = 3 w4(135) = 5
w4(5) = 0 w4(23) = 4 w4(235) = 4
w4(25) = 2
w4(35) = 0 w4(1235) = 7
Notice that the game w4 is not superadditive ( 2 = w4(12) < w4(1)+w4(2) =
4 ) and hence it cannot be an assignment game. Although not being an assign-
ment game, w4 still has a nonempty core. As x = (3, 2, 2, 1, 0) ∈ C(w) and
x4 = b
w
4 = 1 , by part 1 of proposition 4, x−4 = (3, 2, 2, 0) ∈ C(w4) . In fact, as
each player can be paid his marginal contribution in the core of the assignment
game (Demange (1982) and Leonard (1981)), all marginal games of an assign-
ment game are balanced. Formally, for any assignment game (M∪M ′, w) and
any player k ∈M ∪M ′ , we have C(wk) 6= ∅ . In section three, by extending
the above property to all successive reduced games we will prove balancedness
holds for them all.
On the other side, if the reduced games had been assignment games, by
applying proposition 5 to the successive reduced games, we would obtain a
natural method to express all extreme core allocations of the assignment game
as reduced marginal worth vectors. In fact we will achieve the same result, in
spite of them not being assignment games.
From now on, given an optimal matching µ in (M ∪M ′, w) and an order
θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) of the player set, for any s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} , this notation
will be used: let Is = M ∩ {kn, kn−1, . . . , ks}, Js = M ′ ∩ {kn, kn−1, . . . , ks} ,
Ms = M \ Is , M ′s = M ′ \ Js and µs = {(i, j) ∈ µ | i ∈Ms , j ∈M ′s} . Notice
that µs is the restriction to the player set Ms ∪M ′s of the optimal matching
µ fixed for the grand coalition M ∪M ′ .
The following is a technical lemma which will be used in proposition 7
to give a description of the core of the successive reduced assignment game
6
wknkn−1···ks in terms of a fixed optimal matching for the player set M ∪M ′ of
the original game w , under some hypothesis.
Lemma 6 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) an
ordering in the player set and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for all
r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , and we take
∀i ∈Ms , αsi := maxkl∈Js{0, aikl − bw
kn···kl+1
kl
}
∀j ∈M ′s , βsj := maxkl∈Is{0, akli − bw
kn···kl+1
kl
} , (3)
then
1. For all i ∈Ms not assigned by µ , αsi = 0 .
1’. For all j ∈M ′s not assigned by µ , βsj = 0 .
2. For all i ∈Ms not assigned by µs , but assigned to kl ∈ Js by µ , it holds
αsi = aikl − bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
.
2’. For all j ∈ M ′s not assigned by µs , but assigned to kl ∈ Is by µ , it
holds βsj = aklj − bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
.
Proof: Notice first that, by hypothesis, there exists x = (u, v) ∈ C(wkn···ks)
and, as C(wkn···kr) 6= ∅ , for s + 1 ≤ r ≤ n , by completing x with the
corresponding marginal contributions, from part 2 of proposition 4, we get a
core element of the assignment game, that is
(x; bwkn , b
wknkn−1
kn−1 , . . . , b
wknkn−1···ks+1
ks ) ∈ C(w) . (4)
By the description (2) of the core of an assignment game, if µ is an optimal
matching for M ∪M ′ , then,
(1) ui + vj = aij , for all (i, j) ∈ µs ,
(2) ui + b
wknkn−1···kl+1
kl
= aikl if (i, kl) ∈ µ ,
(3) bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
+ vj = aklj if (kl, j) ∈ µ ,
(4) ui + vj ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈Ms ×M ′s , (i, j) 6∈ µs ,
(5) ui + b
wknkn−1···kl+1
kl
≥ aikl for all i ∈Ms and kl ∈ Js .
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(6) bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
+ vj ≥ aklj for all kl ∈ Is and j ∈M ′s ,
(7) ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0 forall i ∈Ms and j ∈M ′s ,
(8) ui = 0 for all i not matched by µ ,
(9) vj = 0 for all j not matched by µ .
To prove 1, if i ∈ Ms is not matched by µ , then from (5) and (8),
0 = ui ≥ aikr − bw
knkn−1···kr+1
kr
, for all kr ∈ Js , and then αsi = 0 .
To prove 2, if (i, kl) ∈ µ , then, from (2), (5) and (7) follows that
ui + b
wknkn−1···kl+1
kl
= aikl
ui + b
wknkn−1···kr+1
kr ≥ aikr , for all kr ∈ Js
ui ≥ 0 ,
and consequently αsi = aikl − bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
. The corresponding proofs for
j ∈M ′s are left to the reader. 2
The constants αsi and β
s
j will play an important role in the core of the
reduced game wknkn−1···ks .
Proposition 7 Let µ be an optimal matching for the game (M ∪M ′, w) ,
θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) an ordering in the player set, and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If
C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for all r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , then
C(wkn···ks) =

ui ≥ αsi , for all i ∈Ms
vj ≥ βsj , for all j ∈M ′s
(u, v) ∈ RMs×M ′s ui + vj = aij if (i, j) ∈ µs
ui + vj ≥ aij if (i, j) 6∈ µs
ui = αsi if i not matched by µs
vj = βsj if j not matched by µs

(5)
where αsi , for all i ∈Ms , and βsj , for all j ∈M ′s , are defined in (3).
Proof: (⊆ ) We have just seen that if (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) , the nine
conditions listed in the proof of lemma 6 hold. From conditions (5) and (7),
we get ui ≥ αsi for all i ∈Ms and from conditions (6) and (7) we get vj ≥ βsi
for all j ∈ M ′s . From (1) and (4) we get ui + vj = aij if (i, j) ∈ µs and
ui + vj ≥ aij if (i, j) 6∈ µs . Moreover, by lemma 6 above, if i is not matched
by µs , then ui = α
s
i and if j is not matched by µs , vj = β
s
j . Therefore,
this first inclusion is proved.
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(⊇ ) Conversely, take (u, v) ∈ RMs×M ′s satisfying all constraints defining
the set in the right hand side of the equality we want to prove. By lemma 6, as
C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ , for all r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , αsi = 0 if i not matched by µ and
αsi = aikl−bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
if (i, kl) ∈ µ for some kl ∈ Js . Similarly, βsi = 0 if j
not matched by µ and βsj = aklj−bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
if (kl, j) ∈ µ for some kl ∈ Is .
Now it is straightforward to see that ((u, v); bwkn , b
wkn
kn−1 , . . . , b
wknkn−1···ks+1
ks
) ∈
C(w) , as it fulfills all core constraints in description (2). Finally, by the
reduced game property of the core elements, (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) . 2
It is well known that for any extreme point of the core of an assignment
game there is a player with zero payoff (see Balinski and Gale (1987)). We
now prove a similar property for the extreme core allocations of the reduced
assignment game wknkn−1···ks . The result is that in every extreme core element
there is a player who receives his lower bound in the representation of the core
of proposition 7.
Lemma 8 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) an
ordering in the player set and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for all
r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , then for all x = (u, v) ∈ Ext(C(wknkn−1···ks)) there exists
either i ∈Ms such that xi = αsi or j ∈M ′s such that xj = βsj .
Proof: We shall consider two different cases. If there exists i∗ ∈ Ms
such that i∗ is not matched by µs , then for any x ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) , by
proposition 7, xi∗ = α
s
i∗ . Similarly, if there exists j
∗ ∈ M ′s not assigned in
µs , then xj∗ = β
s
j∗ .
Otherwise, all players in Ms are assigned to players in M
′
s (and vice–
versa). Assume ui > α
s
i for all i ∈ Ms and vj > βsj for all j ∈ M ′s . Then
we can choose  > 0 such that if we define x¯ , y¯ ∈ RMs×M ′s ,
x¯i = ui +  and y¯i = ui −  for all i ∈Ms ,
x¯j = vj −  and y¯j = vj +  for all j ∈M ′s ,
then x¯ and y¯ belong to the core of the reduced assignment game. Notice
that you can choose  such that x¯i ≥ αsi for all i ∈ Ms , x¯j ≥ βsj for all
j ∈ M ′s . On the other hand if (i, j) ∈ Ms ×M ′s , then x¯i + x¯j = ui + vj . As
(u, v) ∈ C(w) , x¯i + x¯j ≥ aij if (i, j) 6∈ µs and x¯i + x¯j = aij if (i, j) ∈ µs .
The same argument follows for vector y¯ and then, taking the same  > 0
for both vectors, we obtain x¯, y¯ ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) and x = 1
2
x¯ + 1
2
y¯ , which
contradicts x = (u, v) being an extreme point of C(wknkn−1···ks) . 2
The above property allows us to prove that in each extreme allocation of
the core of a reduced assignment game there is a player receiving his marginal
contribution. This will be the point to prove in section 4 that each extreme
of the core of an assignment game is a reduced marginal worth vector.
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Proposition 9 Let (M∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn)
an ordering in the player set and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for all
r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , then, for all x ∈ Ext(C(wknkn−1···ks)) there exists k ∈Ms∪M ′s
such that xk = b
wknkn−1···ks
k .
Proof: By the above lemma, we can assume, without lost of generality,
that there exists i∗ ∈Ms such that xi∗ = αsi∗ . Take µ an optimal matching
in M ∪M ′ . We now consider two cases, depending on whether player i∗ is
matched by µs or not.
Case 1: Assume i∗ not matched by µs .
As x ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) , then
x(Ms ∪M ′s) = wknkn−1···ks(Ms ∪M ′s)
and
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) ≥ wknkn−1···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) . (6)
On the other hand,
x((Ms \ {i∗})∪M ′s) =
∑
(i,j)∈µs
(xi+ xj)+
∑
i∈Ms\{i∗}
i not matched by µs
xi +
∑
j∈M′s
j not matched by µs
xj .
By lemma 6 and the core description (7),
x((Ms\{i∗})∪M ′s) =
∑
(i,j)∈µs
aij+a˜p1kl1−b
w
knkn−1···kl1+1
kl1
+· · ·+a˜pqklq−bw
knkn−1···klq+1
klq
where p1, p2, . . . , pq are players in (Ms \ {i∗}) ∪ M ′s assigned to players
kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq in Is ∪ Js , and we assume l1 > l2 > · · · > lq , and
a˜prklr =
{
aprklr if pr ∈M
aklrpr if pr ∈M ′ .
Now,
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) =
∑
(i,j)∈µs aij +
∑q
r=1(a˜prklr − bw
knkn−1···klr+1
klr
) ≤
w((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
wkn···kl1+1((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
wkn···kl1 ((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=2 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
.......
wkn···klq+1((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s ∪ {klq})− bw
kn···klq+1
klq
≤
wkn···klq ((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) ≤ wkn···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s)
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where all these inequalities follow from the definition of marginal game, that
is, vi(S) ≥ v(S) and vi(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − bvi , for all S 6= ∅ not containing
player i . Therefore,
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) ≤ wkn···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) .
We have then obtained, from (6) and the above inequality, that
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) = wknkn−1···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) ,
so, by efficiency,
x∗i = w
knkn−1···ks(Ms ∪M ′s)− wknkn−1···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪M ′s) = bw
knkn−1···ks
i∗
Case 2: Player i∗ is matched by µs to j∗ ∈M ′s .
By (3), αsi∗ = maxkl∈Js{0, ai∗kl − bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
} and thus there are two possi-
bilities.
• If xi∗ = αsi∗ = 0 , then on one side, being x a core element, x(Ms ∪M ′s) =
wknkn−1···ks(Ms∪M ′s) and x(Ms∪(M ′s\{j∗})) ≥ wknkn−1···ks(Ms∪(M ′s\{j∗})) .
On the other side, by using the same reasoning and notation as in Case 1,
we obtain
x(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) =
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) =∑
(i,j)∈µs, (i,j) 6=(i∗,j∗) aij +
∑q
r=1
(
a˜prklr − bw
knkn−1···klr+1
klr
)
≤
w((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗}) ∪ {kl1 , kl1 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤ · · · ≤
wkn···ks((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) ≤ wkn···ks(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) ,
where the last inequality holds by monotonicity of wknkn−1···ks .
We have then proved that
x(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) = wkn···ks(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗}))
and, by efficiency, xj∗ = b
wknkn−1···ks
j∗ .
• If xi∗ = αsi∗ = ai∗kl∗ − bknkn−1···kl+1kl∗ for some kl∗ ∈ Js , there are again two
possibilities. If there exists i′ ∈ Ms such that (i′, kl∗) ∈ µ , then xi′ = αsi′
and, as i′ is not assigned in M ′s , by case 1 we have xi′ = b
wknkn−1···ks
i′ , so there
is a player who is paid his marginal contribution.
11
Otherwise, there is no i ∈Ms assigned to kl∗ . Then, as x ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) ,
x(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) ≥ wknkn−1···ks(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) . On the other hand, by
an argument similar to the one above,
x(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) =
x((Ms \ {i∗}) ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) + xi∗ =∑
(i,j)∈µs, (i,j) 6=(i∗,j∗) aij +
∑q
r=1(a˜prklr − bw
knkn−1···klr+1
klr
) + ai∗kl∗ − bw
kn···kl∗+1
kl∗ ≤
w(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗}) ∪ {kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq} ∪ {kl∗})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
− bwkn···kl∗+1kl∗ ≤ · · · ≤
wkn···ks(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗}))
We have then proved that
x(Ms ∪ (M ′s \ {j∗})) = wkn···ks(Ms ∪M ′s \ {j∗}))
and, by efficiency, we get xj∗ = b
wknkn−1···ks
j∗ . 2
3 Structure of the core of the reduced assign-
ment game
In this section we study the structure of the successive marginal game wknkn−1···ks ,
trying to extend to this reduced game some well known properties of the orig-
inal assignment game.
Recall first that the core of an assignment game has a particular structure
with two special extreme points. One of them gives each seller her maximum
possible payoff in the core (and so each buyer gets then his minimum possible
payoff inside the core), while the other extreme gives each buyer his maximum
possible payoff in the core. This was proved by Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Now next lemma shows this property is preserved in the core of the reduced
assignment game. For this purpose, when C(wknkn−1···ks) 6= ∅ , we write
u∗i = max{ui | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)}
v∗j = max{vj | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)}
u∗i = min{ui | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)}
v∗j = min{vj | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)}
(7)
Lemma 10 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn)
an ordering in the player set and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for
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all r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , then (u∗, v∗) and (u∗, v∗) are extreme core allocations of
wknkn−1···kr .
Proof: Notice first that if (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) and you define
for all i ∈Ms
ui = min{ui, u′i} and ui = max{ui, u′i}
and for all j ∈M ′s
vj = min{vj, v′j} and vj = max{vj, v′j}
it is easy to prove that (u, v), (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) . We will prove it only
for the point (u, v) .
Let us fix an optimal matching µ of M ∪M ′ . As (u, v) and (u′, v′) are
in the core, by proposition 7, ui ≥ αsi and vj ≥ βsj , for all i ∈Ms , j ∈M ′s .
Moreover, either ui + vj = ui + vj ≥ ui + vj ≥ aij or ui + vj = u′i + vj ≥
u′i + v
′
j ≥ aij .
If (i, j) ∈ µs , then ui+vj = aij and u′i+v′j = aij . Notice that if ui ≥ u′i ,
then vj ≤ v′j and as a consequence ui + vj = u′i + v′j = aij . And if ui ≤ u′i ,
then vj ≥ v′j and ui + vj = ui + vj = aij .
And last, if there exists i ∈Ms not assigned in µs , then, again by propo-
sition 7, ui = u
′
i = α
s
i , which implies ui = ui = α
s
i .
Therefore, (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) . Now, from the classical argument done
by Shapley and Shubick (1972), follows that (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) , and in
fact it is straightforward to see that it is an extreme core allocation. 2
Following the proof of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), we will now see that the
maximum payoff of a player in the core of the reduced assignment game is his
marginal contribution. In fact, what we get is that, apart from the technical
details, the reduced assignment game also satisfies property 2: all marginal
contributions are attained in the core of the reduced assignment game.
Proposition 11 Let (M∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn)
an ordering in the player set and s ∈ {2, . . . , n} . If C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for
all r ∈ {s, . . . , n} , then
1. For all i′ ∈Ms , u∗i′ = bw
knkn−1···ks
i′ ;
2. For all j′ ∈M ′s , v∗j′ = bw
knkn−1···ks
j′ ,
where u∗i and v
∗
j have been defined in (7).
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Proof: We shall only prove the statement for all player i′ ∈ Ms , as by a
similar argument the reader will obtain the result for all players j′ ∈M ′s .
From lemma 10 we know there exists (u∗, v∗) ∈ Ext(C(wknkn−1···ks)) such
that for all i ∈Ms and all j ∈M ′s ,
u∗i = max{ui | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)} and v∗j = min{vj | (u, v) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks)} .
Take then i′ ∈Ms and µ an optimal matching in M ∪M ′ . We now consider
different cases:
Case 1: If i′ not assigned in Ms ∪ M ′s by µs , then from proposition 7
u∗i′ = α
s
i′ and, by the proof of case 1 of proposition 9, α
s
i′ = b
wknkn−1···ks
i′ .
Case 2: If i′ is assigned to j1 ∈M ′s by µs and v∗j1 = βsj1 , then, by applying
to player j1 the case 2 of proposition 9, it is straightforward to check that
u∗i′ = b
wknkn−1···ks
i′ .
Case 3: Otherwise i′ is matched by µs to j1 ∈M ′s and v∗j1 > βsj1 .
Let x be the allocation of the assignment game obtained by completing
(u∗, v∗) with the corresponding marginal contributions:
x = (xk)k∈M∪M ′ = ((u∗, v∗); bwkn , b
wkn
kn−1 , · · · , bw
knkn−1···ks+1
ks ) .
By the balancedness hypothesis and repeatedly applying proposition 4, x is
a core allocation, in fact an extreme point of C(w) .
Following the proof of lemma 8.15 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), construct
an oriented graph with vertices M ∪M ′ and two kind of arcs: given (i, j) ∈
M ×M ′ , if (i, j) ∈ µ , then i −→ j and if xi + xj = aij but (i, j) 6∈ µ , then
j −→ i .
Let T be the set of i ∈ M that can be reached from i′ through an
oriented path. We will assume i′ ∈ T . Let S be the set of j ∈ M ′ that
can be reached from i′ through an oriented path. Notice that, under the
assumptions of case 3, neither T nor S are the empty set, as i′ ∈ T and
j1 ∈ S . Moreover, all oriented paths starting at i′ pass through j1 .
i’ - j1 - i1 - j2 - i2 - . . . - js - is - · · ·

*

*
HHj
HHj

*
HHj
We first prove that
for all i 6∈ T , and all j ∈ S , xi + xj > aij . (8)
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Assume on the contrary that there exists i 6∈ T and j ∈ S such that xi+xj =
aij (recall x ∈ C(w)) . If (i, j) ∈ µ , then, being j ∈ S there exists ı˜ ∈ T
such that ı˜ −→ j , but then (˜ı, j) ∈ µ and contradicts µ being a matching.
On the other hand, if (i, j) 6∈ µ , then j −→ i and as j ∈ S , we get i ∈ T in
contradiction with the hypothesis.
We now claim that “there exists an oriented path c starting at i′ and
ending either at id ∈M not matched by µ to a player in M ′s , or at jd+1 ∈ S
such that xjd+1 = 0 , in such a way that, in both cases, all j ∈M ′ in the path
belong to M ′s ”. The proof of this claim will consider several cases.
If there exists some l ∈ {s, . . . , n} such that kl ∈ S , by definition of set
S it is known to exist a path c = (i′, j1, i1, j2, . . . , jd, id, kl) connecting i′
with kl . Take then the path c = (i
′, j1, i1, j2, . . . , jd, id) . If jt ∈ M ′s for
all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} , this is the path claimed. Otherwise take t∗ = min{t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , d} | jt 6∈ M ′s} and notice that t∗ > 1 as j1 ∈ M ′s . Take then
c = (i′, j1, . . . , jt∗−1, it∗−1} .
Assume kl 6∈ S for all l ∈ {s, . . . , n} .
• If there exists id ∈ T not matched by µ , then there is a path c =
(i′, j1, . . . , jd, id) with the properties claimed.
• Otherwise, all i ∈ T are matched by µ to some player in M ′s . We will
prove that there exists k ∈ S such that xk = 0 .
Assume xk > 0 for all k ∈ S . We then can choose  > 0 such that the payoff
x′ ∈ RM∪M ′ belongs to C(w) , where
x′k = xk +  k ∈ T
x′k = xk −  k ∈ S
x′k = xk k 6∈ S ∪ T .
You only have to take 0 <  < xk for all k ∈ S and  < xi + xj − aij for
all j ∈ S and i 6∈ T , which is possible by claim (8). Then x′k ≥ 0 for all
k ∈M ∪M ′ and x′i+ x′j ≥ aij for i ∈M \ T and j ∈ S . Moreover, if i ∈ T
and j 6∈ S , x′i + x′j = xi + xj +  ≥ aij . On the other hand, for i ∈ T and
j ∈ S , or i ∈M \ T and j ∈M ′ \ S , x′i + x′j = xi + xj . Notice that only in
the two cases i ∈ T and j ∈ S , or i ∈M \ T and j ∈M ′ \ S , it is possible
to have (i, j) ∈ µ and thus all core constraints are satisfied.
- If there exists some kl ∈ T , take l∗ = max{l ∈ {s, . . . , n} | kl ∈ T } . If
l∗ < n , then for all l∗ < l ≤ n , x′kl = xkl = bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
, and that
implies, by RGP of the core, x′−knkn−1···kl∗+1 ∈ C(wknkn−1···kl∗+1) . But
then
x′kl∗ = xkl∗ +  > xkl∗ = b
w
knkn−1···kl∗+1
kl∗
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which contradicts the fact that every player payoff in the core is bounded
above by his marginal contribution. Notice that if l∗ = n , then x′kn =
xkn +  = b
w
kn
+  > bwkn and the same contradiction is reached in C(w) .
- Otherwise, kl 6∈ S ∪ T for all l ∈ {s, . . . , n} and then x′kl = xkl =
bw
knkn−1···kl+1
kl
for all l ∈ {s, s + 1, . . . , n} . Now, as x′ ∈ C(w) , by the
RGP of the core, x′−knkn−1···ks ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) . But x′k < xk = v∗k for
all k ∈ S , in contradiction with the definition of (u∗, v∗) .
Once proved the claim, take an oriented path starting from i′ and ending
either at id ∈ M not assigned in M ′s or at jd+1 ∈ S with xjd+1 = 0 , and
such that all j ∈ S being in the path belong to M ′s . Let this path be
c = (i′, j1, i1, j2, . . . , jd, id) or c = (i′, j1, i1, j2, . . . , jd, id, jd+1) .
Define a matching µ′ in Ms ∪M ′s in the following way:
µ′ =
{
(it, jt) t ∈ {1, . . . , d}
it ∈Ms
}
∪
{
(i, j) ∈Ms ×M ′s (i, j) ∈ µs and
i 6∈ {i′, i1, . . . , id}
}
Then, on one hand, being (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(wknkn−1···ks) ,∑
i∈Ms, i 6=i′
u∗i +
∑
j∈M ′s
v∗j ≥ wknkn−1···ks((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s) .
On the other hand, {A1, A2, A3} is a partition of Ms \ {i′} where
A1 = {i1, i2, . . . , id} ∩Ms
A2 = {i ∈Ms \ {i′, i1, . . . , id} | i matched by µs}
A3 = {i ∈Ms \ {i′, i1, . . . , id} | i not matched by µs}
and {B1, B2, B3, B4} is a partition of M ′s if c = (i′, i1, . . . , id) and of M ′ \
{jd+1} otherwise, where
B1 = {jt ∈ {j1, . . . , jd} | it ∈Ms}
B2 = {jt ∈ {j1, . . . , jd} | it 6∈Ms}
B3 =
{ {j 6∈ {j1, . . . , jd} | j matched by µs} if c = (i′, j1, i1, . . . , id)
{j 6∈ {j1, . . . , jd, jd+1} | j matched by µs} if c = (i′, j1, i1, . . . , id, jd+1)
B4 =
{ {j 6∈ {j1, . . . , jd} | j not matched by µs} if c = (i′, j1, i1, . . . , id)
{j 6∈ {j1, . . . , jd, jd+1} | j not matched by µs} if c = (i′, j1, i1, . . . , id, jd+1) .
As u∗it + v∗jt = aitjt and the players in A2 are matched by µs to the players
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in B3 , we can write∑
i∈Ms, i6=i′ u
∗
i +
∑
j∈M ′s v∗j =∑
it∈A1
jt∈B1
(u∗it + v∗jt) +
∑
i∈A2
j∈B3
(i,j)∈µs
(u∗i + v∗j) +
∑
i∈A3 u
∗
i +
∑
jt∈B2 v∗jt +
∑
j∈B4 v∗j + (v∗jd+1) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij +
∑q
r=1
(
a˜prklr − bw
knkn−1···klr+1
klr
)
,
where the term in brackets is only considered when c = (i′, j1, . . . , id, jd+1)
(then v∗jd+1 = 0 ) and p1, p2, . . . , pq are either players in Ms ∪ M ′s not in
the chosen path c and matched by µ to players klr in Is ∪ Js for some
lr ∈ {s, . . . , n} , or players jt in the path such that it = kl ∈ Is , for some
s ≤ l ≤ n . In the first case, if p ∈ Ms and (p, kl) ∈ µ , then by lemma 6
and proposition 7, u∗p = apkl − bw
kn···kl+1
kl
and if p ∈M ′s such that (kl, p) ∈ µ ,
v∗p = aklp − bw
kn···kl+1
kl
. In the second case, as jt −→ it = kl , we get aitjt =
xit + xjt = b
wknkn−1···kl+1
kl
+ v∗jt .
Moreover, if j ∈ B4 , j cannot be matched by µ to a player it , for
t ∈ {1, . . . , d} . The reason is that if t < d , it is matched by µ to jt+1 ,
while id is either not assigned to a player in M
′
s or assigned to jd+1 when
c = (i′, i1, . . . , id, jd+1) . We finally assume l1 > l2 > · · · > lq , and define
a˜prklr =
{
aprklr if pr ∈M
aklrpr if pr ∈M ′ .
Now,∑
i∈Ms, i 6=i′ u
∗
i +
∑
j∈M ′s v∗j =∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij +
∑q
r=1
(
a˜prklr − bw
knkn−1···klr+1
klr
)
≤
w((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
wkn···kl1+1((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl1 , kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=1 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
wkn···kl1 ((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s ∪ {kl2 , . . . , klq})−
∑q
r=2 b
wkn···klr+1
klr
≤
.......
wkn···klq+1((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s ∪ {klq})− bw
kn···klq+1
klq
≤
wkn···klq ((Ms \ {i′})) ∪M ′s) ≤ wkn···ks((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s)
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where all these inequalities follow from the definition of marginal game.
We thus have∑
i∈Ms, i 6=i′
u∗i +
∑
j∈M ′s
v∗j = wknkn−1···ks((Ms \ {i′}) ∪M ′s)
which, by efficiency, means that u∗i′ = b
wknkn−1···ks
i′ . 2
From the above proposition, each player can attain his marginal contribu-
tion in the core of the successive reduced game wknkn−1···ks , provided all the
previous reduced games are balanced. Finally, next theorem states that given
an assignment game all successive reduced games are balanced.
Theorem 12 Let (M∪M ′, w) be an assignment game and an arbitrary order-
ing θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn−1, kn) in the player set. Then, for all l ∈ {2, . . . , n} ,
C(wknkn−1···kl) 6= ∅ .
Proof: Since w is an assignment game, it is well known that C(w) 6= ∅
(Shapley and Shubick (1972)). Take θ = (k1, . . . , kn) an arbitrary ordering in
M∪M ′ . By property 2, given kn there exists x ∈ C(w) , such that xkn = bwkn .
Now by the reduced game property of core elements, x−kn ∈ C(wkn) , which
proves the marginal game C(wkn) is balanced.
Assume iteratively that given s ∈ {2, . . . , n} , C(wknkn−1···kr) 6= ∅ for all
r ∈ {s, . . . , n} . By lemma 10 and proposition 11 there exists x = (u∗, v∗) and
y = (u∗, v∗) , both in C(wknkn−1···ks) , such that if ks−1 ∈ Ms then xks−1 =
bw
knkn−1···ks
ks−1 and if ks−1 ∈ M ′s then yks−1 = bw
knkn−1···ks
ks−1 . Anyway, there is
a core element z where player ks−1 gets his marginal contribution in the
game wkn...ks . Then, again by the reduced game property for core allocations,
z−ks−1 ∈ C(wknkn−1···ksks−1) and thus the game wkn...ksks−1 is also balanced. 2
After the above theorem follows that the marginal game, wi , although may
be not superadditive (see the example in page 6), always satisfies superaddi-
tive inequalities involving the grand coalition, which are part of balancedness
inequalities (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967). In general, the successive
reduced game wkn...ks , being balanced, will also preserve this property.
4 The extreme core points of the assignment
game
Once proved that all the successive reduced games wknkn−1···kl are balanced,
by proposition 7 C(wknkn−1···kl) can be expressed in terms of any optimal
matching of the gran coalition and, by proposition 9, in each extreme point of
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C(wknkn−1···kl) there is a player who is paid his marginal contribution in the
successive reduced game wknkn−1···kl . Moreover, by proposition 11, for each
player of the game wknkn−1···kl there is an extreme core point where he is paid
his marginal contribution.
Recall from proposition 4 that in order to lift a core allocation of the i–
marginal game to a core element of the original game by completing with the
marginal contribution of player i , we need the original game v to satisfy
condition v(i) ≤ bvi . The balancedness of v and the successively reduced
games that has just been proved, guarantees the above inequality holds in
every step.
We can now state and proof the main result of this paper: the set of
extreme allocations in the core of the assignment game coincides with the
whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors.
Theorem 13 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game, then
ExtC(w) = {rmwθ }θ∈Sn
where Sn is the set of orderings over the player set M ∪M ′ .
Proof: Take x ∈ Ext(C(w)) , by proposition 9 there exists kn ∈ M ∪M ′
such that xkn = b
w
kn
. Now, by RGP for the extreme core points, x−kn ∈
Ext(C(wkn)) . Again by proposition 9 there exists kn−1 ∈ (M \ {kn}) ∪M ′
such that xkn−1 = b
wkn
kn−1 . By repeating the process, in a finite number of steps
we get an ordering θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn−1, kn) ∈ Sn such that x = rmwθ .
Conversely, take x = rmwθ for some θ = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) , which means that
xkl−1 = b
wknkn−1···kl
kl−1 for all l ∈ {2, . . . , n} and xkn = bwkn . In the one–player
game wknkn−1...k2 , xk1 = b
wknkn−1···k2
k1
= wknkn−1···k2(k1) ∈ Ext(C(wknkn−1···k2)) .
From theorem 12, C(wknkn−1···k3) 6= ∅ , and then, by proposition 4, we get
(xk1 ; b
wknkn−1···k3
k2
) ∈ Ext(C(wknkn−1···k3)) . Repeatedly applying theorem 12
and proposition 4, we get x = rmwθ ∈ Ext(C(w)) . 2
After the above characterization of the extreme core allocations of an as-
signment game, we show several characterizations of convex assignment games.
For a convex game (N, v) , as we have pointed out in the introduction
of this paper, and it is straightforward to see, for each permutation θ of
the player set, rmvθ = m
v
θ . In fact this coincidence characterizes convexity
in the class of assignment games, that is to say, if for an assignment game
(M ∪ M ′, w) , rmwθ = mwθ holds for every ordering θ in M ∪ M ′ , then,
from theorem 13, all marginal worth vectors belong to the core and thus w is
convex. However, there is an easier characterization of convexity in assignment
games in terms of the assignment matrix, the proof of which is straightforward
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and can be found in Solymosi (2000). Next proposition gathers these two
characterizations.
Proposition 14 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game defined by matrix
A ∈Mm×m′(R) . The following statements are equivalent:
1. w is convex.
2. rmwθ = m
w
θ for each ordering θ in M ∪M ′ .
3. A is diagonal (i.e., for all i ∈M there exists at most one j ∈M ′ such
that aij > 0 and for all j ∈ M ′ there exists at most one i ∈ M such
that aij > 0 ).
From the above proposition follows easily that the set of convex assignment
games coincides with the set of convex neighbour games defined in Hammers
et.al. (1999).
Also by proposition 14, the worth of a coalition in a convex assignment
game is then the addition of the worth of all possible two–person subcoalitions,
which means it is a 2-game (van der Nouweland et. al. (1996)) and then the
Shapley value and the nucleolus coincide and are easy to compute: for all
i ∈M , if aij > 0 , then φi(w) = aij2 .
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a well known point solution concept
for TU-games, and thus also for assignment games. This value consists on the
average of all marginal worth vectors and then always belongs to the core if the
game is convex. Moreover, as all subgames of a convex game are also convex,
the Shapley value of each subgame belongs to the core of the corresponding
subgame.
It is easy to find examples of assignment games such that the Shapley
value is not a core allocation, but there are also non-convex assignment games
where the Shapley value belongs to the core. Take for instance the 2 × 2
assignment game w defined by the matrix A =
(
2 2
1 3
)
. The Shapley value
is φ(w) = (1.083, 1.417, 0.917, 1.583) and is a core allocation, although this
assignment game is not convex. However, when computing the Shapley value
of the subgame w|S where S = {123} , we get φ(w|S) = (0.667, 0.167, 1.167) .
Notice on one hand that this allocation does not belong to the core of the
subgame w|S and, on the other hand, that the payoff of player 3, acording
to the Shapley value, decreases when player 4 joins coalition {1, 2, 3} , as
1.167 > 0.9171 .
We look for assignment games where the Shapley value has the property
of being population monotonic, that is to say, each player payoff increases
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as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger. Population monotonicity
was defined by Sprumont (1990) and, formally, the extended Shapley value
(φ(w|S))S⊆N is a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (PMAS) if and
only if for all i ∈ N and all pair of coalitions S and T such that i ∈ S ⊆
T , it holds φi(w|S) ≤ φi(w|T ) . It is well known that for convex games the
extended Shapley value is a PMAS. We now prove that in fact this is another
characterization of convexity in the class of assignment games.
Proposition 15 Let (M ∪M ′, w) be an assignment game and, for all coali-
tion S ⊆M ∪M ′ , φ(w|S) the Shapley value of subgame w|S . The following
statements are equivalent:
1. w is convex.
2. (φ(w|S))S⊆M∪M ′ is a PMAS.
Proof: We only have to prove 2⇒ 1 . From the definition of PMAS follows
straightforward that if (φ(w|S)S⊆M∪M ′ is a PMAS, then φ(w|S) ∈ C(w|S) .
Assume now that w is not convex. Then, without lost of generality, we
may assume there is some i ∈ M such that for two different k1, k2 ∈ M ′ ,
aik1 > aik2 > 0 . Take coalition S = {i, k1, k2} . Then
φi(w|S) + φk1(w|S) = aik1 −
aik2
2
< aik1 = w|S(ik1)
which implies φ(w|S) 6∈ C(w|S) and contradicts the extended Shapley value
being a PMAS. 2
Looking at the prove of the above proposition, the next corollary follows
easily.
Corollary 16 An assignment game (M ∪M ′, w) is convex if and only if, for
every three person coalition S , φ(w|S) ∈ C(w|S)
Notice that the game in the exemple above is a non-convex assignment
game and this is why the Shapley value is not a PMAS and the Shapley value
of a three-person subgame is not a core allocation.
In fact convex assignment games are the only assignment games such that
the Shapley value of every subgame belongs to the core of the corresponding
subgame. Which are the assignment games such that the Shapley value is a
core allocation remains an open question.
Let us remark to finish this section that most non–convex assignment
games lack a PMAS, since Sprumont (1990) showed that if the assignment
matrix has a 2 × 2 submatrix with all entries positive, the game has no
PMAS.
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5 Concluding remarks
In Owen (1992) an assignment game with reservation prices is considered.
Given a m×m′ matrix A = (aij) with non-negative entries, and non-negative
reservation prices p1, . . . , pm for the sellers and q1, . . . , qm′ for the buyers, the
game
w(S ∪ T ) = max
µ∈M(S,T )
 ∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij +
∑
i∈M not assigned by µ
pi +
∑
j∈M ′ not assigned by µ
qj

is defined. The interpretacion could be that each agent has a non-negative
profit by remaining unmatched.
It is straightforward to prove that this game is strategically equivalent
to the assignment game (M ∪M ′, w′) with matrix A′ = (a′ij) where a′ij =
max{aij−pi−qj, 0} , that is to say, if x = (p, q) ∈ Rm+m′ , then for all S ⊆M
and T ⊆M ′ , we have w′(S ∪ T ) = w(S ∪ T )− x(S ∪ T ) .
The coincidence between the set of extreme points of the core and the
set of reduced marginal worth vectors is preserved by strategic equivalence
and thus, once proved this coincidence for assignment games, it also holds for
assignment games with reservation prices.
For recent results concerning assignment games the reader is referred to
Solymosi (1999) and Holzman (2000) where it is proved that the core of an as-
signment game coincides with the bargaining set a` la Davis and Maschler and
a` la Mas-Colell; and to Solymosi and Raghavan (2000), where the assignment
games with stable core are characterized.
Interesting results on the extreme points of the core of the assignment
game can be found in Thompson (1981) and Balinski and Gale (1987). Both
state that the core of the assignment game has at most
(
2m
m
)
extreme
points, where m = |M | ≤ |M ′| , and prove that this upper bound is attained.
In Balinski and Gale (1987) a lower bound for the number of extreme points of
the assignment game, under nondegeneracy conditions, is proved to be 2m for
square games and m + 1 for rectangular games. Games for which this lower
bounds are attained are provided. A case of degeneracy in an assignment
game is the Bo¨hm-Bawerk’s horse market: each seller j values his horse in
hj and, in absence of product diferentation, each buyer i values any horse in
ci . The resulting assignment matrix is now defined by aij = max{0, hj − ci}
and, as can be seen in Shapley and Shubik (1972), the core consists on a line
segment with two extreme allocations.
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Finally, it is easy to check that the core of a convex assignment game
(M ∪M ′, w) has at most 2m extreme points (assuming m ≤ m′ ). By propo-
sition 14, once ordered the player set in such a way that aij = 0 for i 6= j , it
is straightforward to see that
C(w) =
{
(u, v) ∈ Rm+m′
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ ui ≤ aii and vi = aii − ui for all 1 ≤ i ≤ mvi = 0 for i > m
}
and thus, in each extreme core allocation, ui must be either 0 or aii . If
aii > 0 for all i ∈M , then the number of extreme core allocations is precisely
2m .
We must also point out that the characterization of the set of extreme
points of the core we have just obtained for bilateral assignment games does
not hold neither for transport games (Thompson, 1981) nor for multiple
partners assignment games (Sotomayor, 1999). Take the following exemple:
M = {1, 2} , M ′ = {3, 4} , the matrix A =
(
1 13
1 1
)
, p = (p1, p2) = (2, 1)
the capacities of agents 1 and 2, and q = (q3, q4) = (1, 1) the capacities
of agents 3 and 4. The transport game (which in this case is also a multi-
ple partners assignment game, as no player is matched more than once with
the same partner) is v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = v(12) = v(34) = 0 ,
v(13) = v(23) = v(24) = v(123) = v(234) = 1 , v(14) = v(124) = 13 and
v(134) = v(1234) = 14 . The core of the game is C(v) = {(x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈
R4+ | x1 ≤ 12, x2 = 0 , x3 = 1 , 1 ≤ x4 ≤ 12 , x1 + x4 = 13 } and player 1
never achieves his marginal contribution bv1 = 13 in the core.
Finally, let us say that we could consider a new value or point solution for
TU games defined as the average of the whole set of reduced marginal worth
vectors. This value will coincide with the Shapley value for convex games
and will belong to the core for assignment games. We left the study of this
solution for a next work.
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